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Abstract 
 The essay identifies the factors that help countries avoid the middle-income trap. We study 
the effect of institutional indicators, and the educational and technological policy variables on the 
income growth of the middle-income countries, with the focus on the upper-middle income countries; 
using the Cross-section OLS estimation and the Fixed-Effects panel estimation. For the countries that 
have already passed the upper-middle income threshold, the tertiary education enrolment rate and 
technological policy variables have a positive and significant effect on the income growth. Regarding 
institutional indicators, the Strong Civil Society and the Bureaucratic Quality only have a positive 
effect on the growth in the estimation across countries. 
Keywords: economic growth, middle-income trap, institutions, education, technology policies, upper-
middle income countries 
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1. Introduction 
 Recently, the middle-income trap has become an issue widely debated among the academics 
and policymakers in developing countries; especially in many East Asian nations that have 
experienced the high rate of growth in the past. They already have progressed from the low-income 
countries to be the middle-income countries. Some of them even became the upper-middle income 
countries and start looking forward to catch up with the predecessors such as the Republic of Korea 
and Taiwan, China. They have escaped poverty, transformed their economic structure to an industrial 
one and tightly integrated themselves with the global economy. However, they have just realised that 
the era of high growth they had enjoyed is over. They found themselves struggling with maintaining 
the competitiveness, and desperately competing with the newcomers that have the lower level of 
development in the labour-intensive industries. At the same time, their productivity is not as high as 
their role model countries. They start to worry that they will follow their Latin American counterparts, 
the widely cited example of the countries that fell into the long-term stagnation, instead of succeeding 
as the next tigers. In other words, they are in the mid-life crisis. 
 Many studies have argued that the educational and technological policies will help the 
middle-income countries, especially the upper-middle ones, achieve the higher level of productivity 
and eventually avoid the ‘trap’. However, the implementation of good policies also needs the good 
institutional background. Without the good bureaucracy, the policies are hardly well delivered. 
Concurrently, the unaccountable executive branch of the government often have the incentive to 
divert from the good policy recommendation for the sake of self-interest. 
 This study tests the relationship between the institutional characteristics and economic 
growth, in addition to the educational and technological policies, with the focus on the upper-middle 
income countries. The study aims to identify the institutional characteristics that have a positive 
relationship with the growth, using the Cross-section OLS estimation and the fixed-effects panel 
estimation. While the study confirms the positive effect of the tertiary education and the technological 
policy variables on the growth, it also recognises two institutional characteristics; namely the Strong 
Civil Society and the Bureaucratic Quality. However, the study cannot prescribe the policymakers on 
the institutional characteristics that they should improve. 
 The next section reviews the previous literature on the definition of the middle-income trap, 
and then we look at the literature on the relationship between the institutional and policy variables and 
income growth. Thereafter, we discuss the data and methodology followed by the results. Lastly, we 
discuss the results and policy implication before concluding the essay.
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2. Literature Review 
 This section outlines the definition of the middle-income trap. Thereafter, we shall move to 
discuss the causes of and the possible recommendation to avoid or escape the middle-income trap 
from the previous literature. This provides the background for study before we move on to the theory 
that we shall use in this paper and the formation of the research question in the next section. 
2.1 What is the middle-income trap? 
 The term ‘poverty trap’ has long been discussed among the development economists as the 
phenomenon that the poor countries, which usually have the higher returns to capital, cannot achieve 
the high growth rate and have to stay in chronic poverty. For the middle-income countries, however, 
they also risk falling into the ‘middle-income trap’, the term stylising the situation where the countries 
have escaped the poverty trap and became the middle-income countries, but are struggling to grow 
further and converge with the high-income countries. (Kharas & Kohli, 2011) There are some middle-
income countries, especially the Latin American countries, that fell into this trap because they have 
the low growth rate and in some case even the reduction in the income level; while some, such as the 
Republic of Korea, can maintain the high growth rate, avoid the trap, and progress to the high-income 
level. (ibid.) 
 However, the specific definition of the middle-income trap remains unclear. To define the 
trap, we need to recognise the length of time that the country have to spend as the middle-income 
country in order to be considered as being fallen into the trap. Felipe, et al. (2012) used the median of 
the years that the countries in their sample have progressed from one World Bank’s income category 
to another World Bank’s income category. The categories consist of the low-income, the lower-
middle income, the upper-middle income, and the high-income categories. Regarding their focus on 
the middle-income trap, they separated the analysis between the lower-middle income trap and the 
upper-middle income trap. They defined the threshold of falling into the trap of 28 years for the 
former, and 14 years for the latter. The countries in the lower-middle income category must have an 
average annual growth rate at 4.7 percent to escape the lower-middle income trap; while the upper-
middle income countries have to sustain an average annual growth rate at 3.5 percent. 
 Eichengreen, et al. (2012) used the growth slowdown framework to identify the possible 
middle-income trap. There are three conditions for the growth slowdown. First, the average growth in 
the seven-year period prior to the slowdown is higher than 3.5 percent per annum. Second, the 
average growth difference between the seven-year periods preceding and following the point of the 
slowdown is higher than 2 percent per annum. Lastly, the income per capita is higher than 10,000 US 
Dollar in 2005 constant international PPP prices. They found that the growth slowdown occurs once 
the country progress to the income level roughly at 16,000 US Dollar. In their updated work 
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(Eichengreen, et al., 2013), they identified another slowdown point at 11,000 US Dollar. So the 
slowdowns occur as steps. 
 Im & Rosenblatt (2013), however, have a different position on the existence of the middle-
income traps. They studied the probability that the countries in different income levels will stay in or 
make a transition to other author-defined income categories. The finding is that, while the countries in 
the low-income group have very high probability (> 0.9) to remain in the same income group, the 
probability of the countries in the higher income level to stay in the same income group is gradually 
reducing as they progress the development path. They concluded that there is no concrete evidence of 
the middle-income trap, in the same fashion as the poverty trap, as the middle-income countries are 
more likely to progress the path up than the low-income countries. They also noted the higher growth 
volatility among the middle-income countries. This implies that the middle-income countries’ growth 
is not trapped, but they are more vulnerable to the negative shocks especially macroeconomic shocks 
such as the 1997 Asian Economic Crisis. However, they still realised that the very high growth rate is 
necessary for the middle-income country to achieve the United States’ income level. They 
acknowledged the fact that it is far-reaching to expect all countries to finally achieve the same income 
level but it is possible for most countries to progress to the high-income level, which is about 60 
percent of the United States’ income level. From their argument, we may still use the middle-income 
trap argument to help focus the policy discussion on the success of development outliers such as the 
newly industrialised countries in East Asia. 
2.2 What cause the middle-income trap, and how to avoid them? 
 Kharas & Kohli (2001) argued that the low- and middle- income countries have different 
channels of growth. For the low-income countries; the movement of factors, especially the labour, 
from the lower productivity to the higher productivity activities, specifically the export sector, is 
adequate to boost the growth. The role of government is only to provide market supporting 
infrastructure. Capital accumulation is relatively easy as it only requires good financial market. 
However, the middle-income countries are facing tougher task. The factors have already moved to the 
higher productivity activities, which lowered the return to capital. The demand side policy became the 
importance. The middle-income countries have to produce higher quality products that attract 
consumers in the global market. At the same time, they have to focus on the domestic market. At this 
moment, the income distribution is crucial because income growth is dependent on demand of lower- 
and middle- classes. To avoid the middle-income trap, they suggested the countries to transform their 
economy through three channels; finding specialisation in the industries that the country do best in 
order achieve the scale and offset the negative impact from the higher wage, supporting the higher 
education and innovation to boost the growth through the Total Factor Productivity (TFP), and to 
decentralise the government so that the decision-making can response to the economic incentive in the 
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local level. They also suggested the middle-income countries to focus on the income redistribution, 
and on the institutional development to support the higher education and good governance. 
Eichengreen, et al. (2012) argued under their growth slowdowns framework that the main 
causes of the slowdown is from the fall of the capital stock share and, more importantly, the fall in the 
proportion of the Total Factor Productivity (TFP) share in the growth equation. Their updated work 
further explained several determinants of avoiding the growth slowdown. These includes the higher 
number of secondary and tertiary schools graduates, the higher technology export content. The 
democratisation, however, increase the chance of a slowdown in some case. Their explanation is that 
democracy can increase wages due to more labour movement participation. (Eichengreen, et al., 2013)  
Aiyar, et al. (2013) also discussed the middle-income trap under the growth slowdown 
framework. They argued that the middle-income countries experienced the slowdowns more often 
than the countries in the other income groups. They tested the possible determinants of the slowdowns 
among the middle-income countries and have the following arguments. First, institutions affect the 
ability of the private sector to do business. They emphasised two institutional characteristics. One is 
the smaller government size, which helps the countries avoid the slowdown through limiting the 
government’s involvement in the economy. Another is the light regulation, which has more effect 
once the countries move closer to the technological frontier. Second, the development in infrastructure 
helps reduce the probability of the slowdowns. Third, the regional integration also helps reduce the 
probability of the slowdowns. Lastly, the diversification of output and trade (in contrast to the 
specialisation) do not reduce the probability of the slowdown in the case of the middle-income 
countries; which agrees with Kharas & Kohli (2001). 
Warr (2011) discussed the causes of the middle-income trap and the suggestion specifically 
for the case of Thailand. He argued that the growth collapse after the Asian Financial Crisis lowered 
the investment rate due to dampened confidence. This led to the decrease in Aggregate Demand in the 
short run, and the decrease in the capital formation rate, which affected the growth in the longer run. 
Thailand is facing a higher wage, which affects the return to capital and hence the rate of investment. 
To escape the trap, Thailand has to improve labour productivity through the investment in human 
capital, especially on the quality aspect of education. He argued that the bureaucratic complications in 
the ministry of education is one of the reason for the low quality of Thai education
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3. Theory and Research Question 
 In this section, we shall look at the previous literature discussing the effect of the policy and 
institutional factors on the economic growth. We connect this literature to the question of avoiding the 
middle-income trap by relating these factors to the growth of the countries that have already 
progressed to the middle-income countries and now aims for catching up with the high-income 
countries. We conclude by formulating the research question that will lead us to the estimation 
methodology in the next section. 
3.1 The relationship between institutional characteristics and income level 
 Recently, the relationship between the institutions and development has become the topic of 
interest among the researchers. For the middle-income countries, the good policies that respond to the 
challenges they are facing have been argued as the binding constraints of avoiding the middle-income 
trap. In this study, we want to find out whether the institutions also have the effects on the growth of 
the middle-income countries as the policy has. 
Rodrik, et al. (2004) argued that the institutional quality is the most important factor in 
determining the cross-national income. They tested their argument against the two other competing 
ideas that support the importance of geography and trade openness. They used the instrumental 
variables for the institution and the trade openness variables due to the variables’ endogenous nature. 
The proxy they used for the institution is the Rule of Law, with the settler mortality as the 
instrumental variable following Acemoglu, et al. (2001). They also considered the interaction between 
the institutions, geography, and the trade variables as the indirect effect. Because these factors, except 
geography, are endogenous. However, they acknowledged that they could not confirm the causal 
relationship from the use of instrumental variables. The institutions can mutate over time, and the use 
of geographically related variable as the instrument for the institutions denies this mutability. 
Campos & Nugent (1999) looked at different institutional characteristics to examine their 
effects on the developmental aspects; specifically the income per capita, the adult illiteracy rate, and 
the infant mortality rates. They identified ten institutional indicators, which represents five 
institutional characteristics. Using Spearman rank correlation coefficients, they grouped the indicators 
that have high correlation together. Then, they picked the four institutional indicators that have low 
correlation so they represent different things. These are the Accountable Executive, the Strong Civil 
Society, the Bureaucratic Quality, and the Rule of Law. They tested them using the Cross-section 
estimation to find the relationship between the indicators and development aspects. Using income per 
capita as the dependent variable, they found that the Strong Civil Society has a positive and 
significant relationship with income per capita in East Asian countries sample; while the Bureaucratic 
Quality and the Rule of Law perform best for the Latin American countries. 
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3.2 The relationship between policy variables and income level 
Islam (1995) proposed the use of panel data to identify the determinants of economic growth. 
He started with the Solow growth model, which composed of the accumulation of capital and labour, 
and the Total Factor Productivity (TFP) that the latter is the part of growth that cannot be explained 
by the two former determinants. Using panel data with the fixed effects estimator, this unexplained 
part of growth can be explained by using the policy variables. In his work, he used the average 
schooling year – secondary and the all levels of schooling – to identify their effect on the growth 
through the TFP part of the Solow’s equation. 
Lee & Kim (2008) examined the effect of the institutions and the economic policies on the 
growth of countries in different income levels. They used the executive constraint indicator from the 
Polity IV database as a proxy for institutions, while identified the educational and technological 
indicators of the countries for the policy variables. They tested the relationship between these 
variables and income separately for the countries in the lower and the higher income level. What they 
found is that the institutional variable has a positive relationship with the growth in both country 
groups. However, the effect is stronger for the lower-income countries group. In the higher income 
countries group, the ones that already have passed the upper-middle income threshold and looking 
forward to be the high-income countries; the higher level of education and technological policy 
variables became crucial to the growth. 
3.3 Research Question 
 The purpose of this essay is to study the policy and institutional factors that affect the growth 
of the countries in different income groups, with the focus on the countries that already have 
progressed to be the upper-middle income countries using the World Bank classification. These 
countries already have escaped the poverty and are trying to converge to the high-income countries. 
We have discussed the possible cause of falling into the middle-income trap. It is that they are unable 
to change their policy to cope with the challenges they are facing, specifically their inability to 
compete with the lower income countries due to their higher wage while still lacking the high 
productivity to compete with the high-income countries. The possible strategy to avoid the middle-
income trap is to sustain the high level of growth. We want to study the factors that enable this, with 
the focus on the policy and institutional determinants. Hence, our research question is 
 “What kind of policies and institutional characteristics help the upper-middle income 
countries to sustain a high growth rate and avoid the middle-income trap?”
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4. Data and Methodology 
 This section will first discuss the description and the rationale for the choice of data used. The 
descriptive statistics of the data will provide the overview and the difference among different groups 
of country. Then, we shall outline the methodology we use to estimate what we want to study, 
specifically the effect of policy and institutions on economic growth. 
4.1 Data 
 4.1.1 Country and period of study 
 The countries used in our study mainly follow Campos & Nugent (1999). We are interested in 
two regions, specifically Latin America and East Asia, because the data from these regions is widely 
available, and most of the countries have already escaped the poverty trap and progressed to be 
middle-income countries. Many Latin American countries are notable cases of being caught in the 
middle-income trap. Some East Asian countries have become success stories of catching up, while 
others are trying to avoid the middle-income trap. In contrast, African and South Asian countries are 
poorer, and their data is harder to find. Middle-Eastern countries have the development pattern 
distinct from countries in other regions, especially oil exporting countries. 
 We classify countries into two income groups. Our assumption is that the countries that have 
developed and just joined the middle-income group will need different factors to maintain growth rate 
and avoid the middle-income trap. The criteria we use is the World Bank classification for upper-
middle income countries in 2012, which provides a reasonable threshold for the development level. 
The threshold is the 2012 current price Gross National Income (GNI) per capita at 3,976 US Dollar, 
using the Atlas method. Although the World Bank income classification uses only income, other 
development indicators such as infant mortality and poverty are also taken into account when they set 
the threshold income level. Countries with a certain income level mostly have a corresponding level 
in other indicators. Though the current price GNI is used, the World Bank adjust the thresholds for the 
inflation every year. The Atlas method also reduces the effect from exchange rate fluctuation in short-
term. Therefore, the classification represents the fixed level of development over time. (Felipe, et al., 
2012) According to the World Bank (1989), there is difficulty and the methodology issues in using 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) income for international comparison. For example, the PPP method 
can estimate the quantities of goods and services, but there is a serious problem on the quality 
difference across countries. The consumer preference also affects the validity of PPP. We classify all 
countries with GNI above the threshold as higher income countries, and classify the rest as lower 
income countries. 
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 Table 4.1 lists the countries used in our study. Our country samples largely follow Campos & 
Nugent (1999). However, we drop Jamaica and Taiwan, China because the data is missing. We also 
add two countries, specifically China (People’s Republic of) and Vietnam, due to their transition to 
market economy and increasing integration with the global economy in recent years. The samples 
consist of 29 countries. 11 countries is in lower income group, while 18 countries is in higher income 
groups. 
Table 4.1: List of countries in the study 
Lower income Higher income 
Latin America East Asia Latin America East Asia 
Bolivia Indonesia Argentina China* 
El Salvador Philippines Brazil Hong Kong SAR, China 
Guatemala Vietnam* Chile Republic of Korea 
Guyana  Colombia Malaysia 
Haiti  Costa Rica Singapore 
Honduras  Dominican Republic Thailand 
Nicaragua  Ecuador  
Paraguay  Mexico  
  Panama  
  Peru  
  Uruguay  
  Venezuela  
* denotes additional countries from Campos & Nugent (1999) samples. 
 The period of study is from 1995-2012. We use a period later than the previous works due to 
two reasons. First, several countries have just passed the upper-middle income threshold; for example 
Brazil, Colombia, Thailand. We want to prove whether their growth determinants are the different one 
from lower income countries. Using historical data from earlier time, when they were lower income 
countries, might not reflect the pattern in recent years well. Second, the data on institutional indicators 
for recent years has become widely available. 
 4.1.2 Data sources and discussion on the choice of data 
 The income and policy variables data is from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (WDI), with one exception. The institutional variables data is from Polity IV project and 
Political Risk Services’ (PRS) International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The data from PRS is 
obtained via the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Index (WGI) as secondary source, because the 
primary source is only available commercially. 
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 Dependent variable 
 The dependent variable is Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita. The choice of data we 
use is GDP per capita in constant 2005 US Dollar. The reason we do not use PPP adjusted GDP is the 
limitations abovementioned. However, instead of using current US Dollar GDP per capita, we use 
constant US Dollar GDP per capita because it is adjusted for inflation; in other words, it is the real 
income variable. Therefore, in the level cross-section estimation where we have to use average GDP 
per capita over years, the variable is not biased because of inflation rate. At the same time, in the 
change cross-section Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and Fixed Effects panel estimations, the growth 
rate is real and the bias from inflation is eliminated. The source of data is the World Bank’s WDI. 
 Control variable 
 We use population growth rate as a control variable for the change estimations. It is time-
variant. So we also have to control it in Fixed Effects panel estimation. The source of data is the 
World Bank’s WDI. 
 Policy variables 
 The policy variables used in this study follows Lee & Kim (2008). The focus are the variables 
related to education and technological development, while the trade variable is included because of 
several authors’ discussion the effect of trade openness and liberalisation on economic growth. (see 
Romer & Frankel (1999) or Wacziarg & Welch (2003) for example) However, Lee & Kim (2008) 
hypothesis is on the effect of the former on the economic growth. Our study uses a newer dataset to 
test whether their argument is still valid. We add institutional variables to test whether they also affect 
growth. The source of data for all policy variables, except patent applications, is the World Bank’s 
WDI. Data for some countries in some years is missing. However, the use of average in the estimation 
dramatically reduces missing data. The policy variables are as follows. 
 First, Secondary school enrolment. We use gross enrolment ratio. It is the ratio of total 
enrolment to the population in official secondary education age. (World Bank, 2015) The source of 
data is the World Bank’s WDI. 
 Second, Tertiary school enrolment. We use gross enrolment ratio. It is the ratio of total 
enrolment to the population in five-year age group after finishing secondary education. (World Bank, 
2015)  For example; if the age of finishing secondary education is 18 years old, then the five-year age 
group will be between 19-23 years old. The source of data is the World Bank’s WDI. 
 Third, Number of the US patent applications per million population. We treat the variable as a 
proxy for technological development. The country that has a higher level of the technological 
development probably has a larger number of the patent applications. The use of the US patent 
applications removes the variation of the proxy’s representativeness across countries. We use the 
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number of utility patent applications filed in the United States, by the country of origin. (US Patent 
and Trademark Office, 2015) The source of data is the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). 
We divide the total number of applications by the population in millions from the same year, to obtain 
the number of applications per million populations. The source of population data is the World Bank’s 
WDI. 
 Fourth, the Research and Development (R&D) expenditure as percentage of GDP. The source 
of data is the World Bank’s WDI. 
 Fifth, the trade as percentage of GDP. It accounts for both imports and exports, of goods and 
services. (World Bank, 2015) Therefore, it is the openness index. The source of data is the World 
Bank’s WDI. 
 Institutional variables 
The four institutional characteristics capture different dimensions of governance institutions. 
These different institutional characteristics are complementary. However, the effects they had on the 
development objective are possibly not to the same extent, which Campos & Nugent (1999) tried to 
find out in their article. For example, they found that only the Strong Civil Society has a significant 
and positive relationship with income in East Asia; while the Bureaucratic Quality and the Rule of 
Law have a significant and positive relationship with income in Latin America. In this paper, we will 
use the same institutional variables they used as follows, though some limitation on the data force us 
to adopt the closest alternatives in some case, specifically the Law and Order. 
First, the Accountable Executive indicator captures the extent that the government executive 
are responsible for its decision-making. (Campos & Nugent, 1999) Two indexes from Polity IV 
project measure two different aspects of this accountability. One is the executive constraint, which 
measures the limit on decision-making power that executive branch are subject to. It is ranked from 1, 
where executive branch have unlimited power, to 7, where the legislative or ruling parties have to 
appoint and provide the support to the executive. Another is the regulation of executive recruitment, 
which measures the degree that the selection of executive are subject to predetermined rule, either by 
birthright or by election. It is ranked from 1, which is for the unregulated recruitment such as a coup, 
to 3, which is for the regime with institutionalised recruitment process where it is hard for the ruling 
power to alter the rule. (Marshall, et al., 2013) The different dimensions of the Accountable Executive 
are interacted and expressed in single index. This is because the country with constraint but no 
regulation do not have a well-established constraint that prevent current ruler to change the rule to 
maintain their power perpetually, in other words, the constraint can be annulled easily. In contrast, the 
country without a constraint do not have the accountable executive in its own right, whether the 
regulation is well defined or not. To achieve the high score in the “Accountable Executive” require 
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the regime have both constraint and recruitment regulation on the executive. These indexes are 
interacted by multiplying each other, and then rescaled from 1-10. 
Second, the Strong Civil Society indicator measures the extent public can participate and 
check the decision-making process. (Campos & Nugent, 1999) Two indexes from Polity IV project 
measure two different aspects of this characteristic. One is the competitiveness of political 
participation, which measures the opportunity that the alternative set of policies other than the 
prevailing one can compete in the politics. It is ranked from 1, where no opposition is allowed, to 5, 
where there is a regular competition between political groups in the national level. Another is the 
regulation of political participation, which measures whether the rule of participation is well 
established, either it is the totalitarian state where it is generally accepted that the participation is not 
allowed at all, or the western democracy where political groups are stable and compete under defined 
rule. It is ranked from 1, where there is no regulation at all, and political groups can evolve all the 
times, to 5, where political groups are stable. (Marshall, et al., 2013) The different dimensions of the 
Strong Civil Society are interacted and expressed in single index. The country with high score on the 
competition but low score on the regulation will has low level of the interacted “Strong Civil 
Society”, because the competitiveness their political process has is unstable or alterable easily. In 
contrast, the country with low score on the competition but high score on the regulation has low level 
of the interacted “Strong Civil Society”, because it is a well-established totalitarian state. These 
indexes are interacted multiplying each other, and then rescaled from 1-10. 
Third, the Bureaucratic Quality index from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
measures the extent bureaucracy are independent from politics and have stable recruitment process. 
High score means that the governance will not interrupt from political change; and the policy and 
administration are insulated from government change. The original index scaled from 0-4. (The PRS 
Group, Inc., 2012) However, we use secondary source from the World Bank’s WGI, published as a 
rescaled index from 0-1 because the original index is only available commercially. We then rescale it 
again to 0-10. 
Fourth, the Law and Order index from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) measures 
the quality of legal system. Campos & Nugent (1999) used the indicator for Rule of Law Tradition 
from ICRG. However, it is not available in the current publication and the closest available is the 
indicator for the Law and Order. It measures two dimensions at the same time. The first one measures 
whether the law is strong and impartial. The second one is whether the law is observed in reality, in 
other words, whether judicial system works. The original index is scaled from 0-6 as a sum of each 
dimensions scaled from 0-3. (The PRS Group, Inc., 2012) However, we use secondary source from 
the World Bank’s WGI, published as a rescaled index from 0-1 because the original index is only 
available commercially. We then rescale it again to 0-10. 
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The World Bank’s WGI also represents the institutional characteristics close to what we use 
in our study. Their Government Effectiveness Index can represent the Bureaucratic Quality, while 
their Rule of Law Index can represent the Rule of Law. However, the pairwise correlation between 
both WGI’s indexes is very high (>0.90). So they effectively capture the same factor underlying the 
institutional characteristics. The WGI is calculated by combining several institutional indexes 
published by other institutions. The World Bank published raw data they used to calculate their index, 
and several of them are the indexes from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). We decide to use 
WGI’s raw data as the secondary source for ICRG’s indexes. 
Regarding the ICRG’s indicators, the year 1997, 1999, and 2001 are missing because WGI 
was published every two years before 2002. However, this does not pose any problem to our analysis 
because of two reason. First, the estimation use average level of variables, either for the whole period 
or for three-year span. Second, the institutional variables change slowly over time. Using variables 
from a year before or after will only affect the result little. 
All institutional indicators are rescaled from 1-10, so we can compare the magnitude of 
coefficient easily. The coefficient means the change of dependent variable when the indicator increase 
by 1 out of 10, or by 10 percentage points. 
4.1.3 Descriptive statistics 
Here we discussed the general characteristics of the independent variables of our interest. We 
first look at the policy variables and thereafter move on to the institutional variables. Table 4.2 shows 
the means of policy variables, and the means differences between country groups. It can be seen that 
the value of variables are different between regions and between countries with different income 
levels. Considering the latter as it is our main interest in this study, all variables are significantly 
different. The difference between income groups of almost all variables are significant at 1 percent 
level. Only the difference of trade to GDP is significant at 5 percent level. The general picture is that 
the countries in higher income group have higher level of policy variables. Please note, however, that 
this comparison is highly endogenous; because countries with higher income level will also have 
better education and technological indicators. Education indicators can be viewed as the result of 
development success along with income level. In other words, we cannot determine the direction of 
effect. The difference in policies variables entices us to study whether policy variables still have the 
same effect once countries progress to be higher income countries. In this study, more emphasis is 
given to institutional variables, because this is our extension from Lee & Kim (2008) analysis, which 
mainly focused on policy variables. Table 4.3 shows the means of institutional variables, and the 
means differences between country groups. It can be seen that the lower and higher income group 
have roughly the same level of the Accountable Executive indicator. Regarding other variables, the 
differences between income groups are significant at 1 percent level. As expected, higher income 
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countries have better institutional characteristics. We also includes the data during 1982-1995 from 
Campos & Nugent (1999) for comparison. The characteristics of institutional variables between 
regions remain the same for both periods. Latin American countries have higher level of the 
Accountable Executive and the Strong Civil Society indicators; while East Asian countries have 
higher level of the Bureaucratic Quality, and the Law and Order (or Rule of Law) indicators. 
Table 4.2: The means and means differences of policy variables 
Period 1995-2012 
Region Latin America East Asia 
Lower 
income 
Higher 
income 
Secondary school enrolment rate, in percentage 
  73.70 
  (0.99) 
  261 
  74.86 
  (1.39) 
  111 
  66.18*** 
  (1.40) 
  124 
  77.98*** 
  (0.89) 
  248 
Tertiary school enrolment rate, in percentage 
  32.46 
  (1.21) 
  197 
  33.45 
  (2.13) 
  129 
  19.73*** 
  (0.77) 
  121 
  40.59*** 
  (1.46) 
  205 
Patent applications per million populations 
  1.34*** 
  (0.09) 
  293 
  68.44*** 
  (9.97) 
  158 
  0.24*** 
  (0.02) 
  128 
  34.59*** 
  (5.21) 
323 
R&D expenditure, as percentage of GDP 
  0.32*** 
  (0.02) 
  155 
  1.29*** 
  (0.10) 
  93 
  0.11*** 
  (0.01) 
  43 
  0.80*** 
  (0.06) 
  205 
Trade, as percentage of GDP 
  69.51*** 
  (2.09) 
  353 
157.91*** 
  (9.27) 
  162 
  86.80** 
  (2.89) 
  191 
  103.53** 
  (5.62) 
  324 
1. *,**,*** denote significance of the difference between the regions or income groups at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, 
respectively. 
2. The standard deviation is in parenthesis. The number of observations is in the third line. 
Table 4.3: The means and means differences of institutional characteristics 
Period 1982-1995 1995-2012 
Region 
Latin 
America 
East Asia 
Latin 
America 
East Asia 
Lower 
income 
Higher 
income 
Accountable Executive 
   50.87    42.05    8.10*** 
  (0.09) 
   5.35*** 
  (0.25) 
   7.27 
  (0.17) 
   7.32 
  (0.15) 
Strong Civil Society 
   40.73    33.48    3.93* 
  (0.15) 
   2.59* 
  (0.08) 
   2.58*** 
  (0.05) 
   4.15*** 
  (0.17) 
Bureaucratic Quality 
   3.89**    6.01**    4.74*** 
  (0.12) 
   6.70*** 
  (0.15) 
   4.48*** 
  (0.17) 
   5.88*** 
  (0.12) 
Rule of Law    4.33**    6.38**     
Law and Order 
     4.41*** 
  (0.09) 
   6.67*** 
  (0.16) 
   4.33*** 
  (0.13) 
   5.59*** 
  (0.13) 
1. *,**,*** denote significance of the difference between the regions or income groups at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, 
respectively. 
2. The data from 1982-1995 is from Campos & Nugent (1999) 
3. The interaction variables “Accountable Executive” and “Strong Civil Society” in our study are rescaled from 
0-100 to 0-10. In contrast, Campos & Nugent (1999) study, which is assumed to rescaled from 1-100 
4. The different across periods cannot be tested, as we do not have the raw data for the period 1982-1995. 
5. The standard deviation is in parenthesis. 
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Next, we consider the correlation coefficients between the institutional indicators. High 
correlation between the institutional indicators means that they represent the same institutional 
characteristics; while low correlation means that they represent different characteristics. The choice of 
the indicators we use should have low correlation with each other, which means that they complement 
each other rather than substitute. In other words, we should not include two variables that represents 
the same things. Table 4.4 shows pairwise correlation coefficients. We can see that the Accountable 
Executive has small, negative, significant correlation with the Bureaucratic Quality and the Law and 
Order. Moreover, the pairs of indicators from the same sources have higher and significant 
correlation, specifically a pair of the Accountable Executive and the Strong Civil Society indicators, 
and a pair of the Bureaucratic Quality and Law and Order. However, the size of correlation 
coefficients is not high. Therefore, we can conclude that the choice of institutional variables 
represents different characteristics and is proper for further analysis. 
Table 4.4: The correlation coefficients, p-values, and number of observations of the institutional 
characteristics 
 Accountable 
Executive 
Strong Civil 
Society 
Bureaucratic 
Quality 
Law and 
Order 
Accountable 
Executive 
1.0000    
    
386    
    
Strong Civil 
Society 
0.3883*** 1.0000   
0.0000    
386 386   
    
Bureaucratic 
Quality 
-0.1131** 0.0461 1.0000  
0.0263 0.3662   
386 386 386  
    
Law and 
Order 
-0.2001*** 0.0707 0.3673*** 1.0000 
0.0001 0.1658 0.0000  
386 386 386 386 
    
1. *,**,*** denote significance level of correlation coefficients at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. 
Lastly, we look at the change in the institutional indicators over the period of study, shown in 
figure 4.1. Panel A, B and C show the change of average level of indicators for all countries, lower 
income countries and higher income countries, respectively. While the level of indicators are different 
between income groups, the trend across time is quite the same. What we can say is that the 
institutional indicators we use are not time-invariant; they change over time. The level of Accountable 
Executive indicator was increasing over time in all countries groups. The level of Law and Order 
indicator was dramatically decreasing. The level of Strong Civil Society indicator was slightly 
increasing. Lastly, the level of Bureaucratic Quality indicators is worth special mentioning. Before 
2001, the level was increasing in lower income countries group, while slightly decreasing in higher 
income countries group. However, the level remained constant afterwards in all countries groups. The 
secondary source of data for the Bureaucratic Quality indicator we use, the World Bank’s WGI, has 
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been rechecked to ensure that it is not our calculation mistake. We confirm that the published raw data 
remained constant. We investigate further by using free sample ICRG table published by PRS.  The 
only month available in the free sample is January 2015. We rescale back the Bureaucratic Quality 
indicator to the original scale (because we use the rescaled value published in WGI in our study) and 
compare the values. What we found this that the level for almost all countries in January 2015 
remains as same as the level in 2002 and 2012. Only two countries, namely Bolivia and Mexico, have 
different level and they only changed slightly. 
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Figure 4.1: Change of the average institutional indicators over time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A: The average level for all countries in the study 
 
Panel B:  The average level for lower income countries group 
 
Panel C: The average level for higher income countries group 
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4.2 Estimation Methodology 
 The estimation strategy in this work will follow Campos & Nugent (1999) and Lee & Kim 
(2008). The techniques used are cross-section Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation and Fixed 
Effects panel regression. 
 The aim of estimation is to test the relationship between policy and institutional 
characteristics and economic growth of developing countries, especially for the ones that already have 
passed the upper-middle income threshold. 
 4.2.1 Cross-Section Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation 
 First, we shall estimate only the relationship between institutional variables and income level 
using the model follow Campos & Nugent (1999). Thereafter, we move on estimating the relationship 
that the policy and institutional variables have with the income growth rate follow Lee & Kim (2008). 
Campos & Nugent (1999) classified countries by the regions, Latin America and East Asia. 
However, to fit the purpose of this study, we reclassified it by income level. Their cross-section OLS 
specification relates the relationship between income level (GDP per capita) and institutional 
characteristics. They did not study the effect institutional characteristics has on the growth rate. 
Therefore, this cannot imply that country with higher level of statistically significant institutional 
characteristics will achieve faster growth and avoid the middle-income trap. What we can see is only 
the relationship, for example, the country with higher or lower level of institutional characteristics 
usually have higher income level. We first use the following specification. 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼1 + 𝛾1𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖    (1) 
 Where 𝑌𝑖 is the average level of GDP per capita for the country i across the period of our 
interest. 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖 is the average level of institutional variables for each country i across the period. What 
we can draw from the result is that the coefficients can tell the estimated average income level 
difference when the country have higher score on the institutional indicator by 10 percentage points. 
We first estimate only institutional variables themselves, and then we add the interaction terms 
between each institutional variables into the model to see whether there are substitutability and 
complementarity between variables. To calculate the interaction term, we pair two institutional 
variables and multiply one variable with another within the same pair, and then rescale the resulted 
value back to 0-10 scale. When institutional variables are substitutable, the coefficient of the 
interaction term will be negative. This means that one institutional variable creates the same effect as 
another. Having just one of them is enough and having both of them does not mean that the effect will 
be as high as the separate effect of each variables. When the institutional variables are 
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complementary, the coefficient of the interaction term will be positive. This means that both variables 
have an extra effect when they exist together. 
 The next cross-section OLS specification used follows Lee & Kim (2008). We run estimation 
for the countries in different income categories separately. Dependent variable is the growth of 
income level (GDP per capita) during the period of study. We introduce the policy variables to the 
model along with the institutional variables. Moreover, we also include population growth rate as a 
control variable, which is widely known to affect the growth; so the omitted variable bias reduces. 
Now the estimation directs to our study, specifically the effect of both policy and institutional 
determinants on the growth. The specification is as follows. 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦𝑖0 = 𝛼2 + 𝜃2𝑦𝑖0 + λ2𝑃𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑖 + 𝛿2𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑖 + 𝛾2𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (2) 
 In the cross-section OLS estimation, there is no time variable as the analysis is across the 
countries. Hence, the variables are mostly the average or the difference across the period of study. The 
dependent variable is the total growth rate across the period. 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the country i’s natural log of GDP 
per capita in the last year (year t) of the period, while 𝑦𝑖0 is the country i’s natural log of GDP per 
capita in the beginning year of the period. 𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦𝑖0 is hence interpreted as the country i’s total growth 
of GDP per capita from the beginning until the end of the period, because the difference of the natural 
log terms from different points in time is understood as the growth rate. To control for the difference 
in the initial income across countries, we include the beginning year natural log of GDP per capita, 
𝑦𝑖0, as a control variable. 𝑃𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑖 is the country i’s average population growth rate. 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑖 is the 
country i’s average policy variable, while 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖 is the country i’s average institutional variable. 
 Lee & Kim (2008) estimated by adding the policy variables one by one in each regression, 
and also conducted the estimation with all variables included. Regarding the education variables, they 
also tried using the initial value when they add the variables one by one. We follow their approach. 
However, our emphasis is on the estimation with all variables included due to better goodness of fit. 
 As most dependent variables are in the form of rate or index, interpretation is quite 
straightforward. For example, the coefficient for secondary education enrolment rate implies the 
difference of the growth rate across period when the country has higher average enrolment rate by one 
percentage point. In the same way, the coefficient for the strong civil society indicator implies the 
difference of the growth rate when the country has higher average level of the indicator by 10 
percentage points. (Because the institutional variables are scaled from 1-10) 
The OLS estimation is a simpler model, which provide us with a broad picture of the 
relationship between variables. However, the relationship cannot direct to causal effect between the 
variables of interest. The OLS estimation is under the assumption that the error terms are independent 
and normally distributed. There should be no correlation between the error terms and the independent 
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variables, in other words, no endogeneity. However, the variables omitted from the model often affect 
both independent and dependent variables at the same time. Moreover, independent variables often 
correlate with each other. To lessen the problem, the model have to be controlled. However, 
controlling involves the inclusion of more variables and it is far reaching to do it completely. Another 
solution is to use Instrumental Variable (IV); by using another variable that is surely exogenous and 
its relationship with independent variable of our interest is known. The variable with this 
characteristic is often historical or geographical one. This means that the study of variable that 
changes across the time is often not possible. The undeniable consequence of using these kinds of 
exogenous variable is that we have to assume that the independent variable of our interest is 
predetermined. In other words, we are forced to deny that the independent variable can evolve over 
time. From these limitations, we decide to use more advance technique, so called the Fixed Effects 
panel regression. 
4.2.2 Fixed Effects panel estimation 
Panel regression takes into account both time and cross-section dimensions of the data. The 
first consequence is that the sample size is larger, making the result more reliable. The Fixed Effects 
panel regression also considers the time-invariant characteristics of each sectional. This helps reduce 
the omitted variable bias. Though endogeneity is not completely eliminated, the model removes time-
invariant endogeneity. To do this, the model includes the fixed effects term of each countries. The 
variables such as the initial level of education, geography and initial income level are automatically 
controlled. In other words, the countries are not assumed homogenous anymore. 
To convert the data into the panel, Lee & Kim (2008) divided the whole period of study into 
the five-year spans. We use the three-year spans from 1995-2012 instead due to the shorter period of 
interest. The model is estimated separately for the groups of countries in different income levels. The 
dependent variable is the average level of natural log of GDP per capita for the three-year span, 
denoted 𝑦𝑖𝑡. The reason for the choice of dependent variable is that the Fixed Effects estimator takes 
the initial level natural log of GDP per capita as the fixed effects term. The Fixed Effect estimator 
uses the technique called ‘demeaning’, where the values of variables in each observation are 
subtracted by the average value of the variables. For example, 𝑦𝑖0 − ?̅?𝑖0 which equals zero because 
𝑦𝑖0 is time-invariant. When we use the difference between the initial level natural log of GDP per 
capita and the level in the year of observations as a dependent variable, with the initial level as a 
control variable on the right hand side; the coefficient of the initial level drops from the model 
because it is time-invariant. Moreover, all coefficients of independent variables are as same as in the 
specification with the average level of natural log of GDP per capita for the three-year sub period as a 
dependent variable. Only the constant term, and presumably the fixed effects terms, lowers; in order 
to reflect the fact that the dependent variables is just the level of natural log of GDP per capita 
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deducted by the constant initial level of natural log of GDP per capita. (So the constant initial level is 
excluded from the constant and the fixed-effect terms) 
Even though the dependent variable is the level of income, the coefficient of independent 
variable implies the difference of dependent variable with respect to the independent variable. For 
example; when the strong civil society indicator is higher by 1 point (10 percentage points), the level 
of natural log of GDP is predicted to change by the size of its coefficient. Ceteris Paribus. The fixed 
effects model focuses on the within sectional difference. It demeans the variables across time, not the 
sections. Hence, even though the assumption of the coefficient is that it can explain the same change 
of dependent variables, whether it is the change across time or section; it can explain the variation 
across the time better than the variation across the section. (Verbeek, 2013) While the Cross-section 
estimation in the previous specification estimates the difference in the income growth across the 
countries; the fixed effects estimation better explains the difference in the income level across time, 
while acknowledging the difference across section as per the assumption of panel estimation, with 
respect to the independent variables. The difference in the income level across time implies the 
growth (or decline), hence the coefficients of the policy and institutional variables in the fixed effects 
estimation implies the growth of the income, when we give more concern on the time dimension. The 
change in the natural log term already implies the rate of change, or the rate of growth. We are not 
discussing the particular period of growth. The fixed effects estimation predicts the change of income 
level or the growth, with respect to the change of policy and institutional variables, either across the 
three-year sub period or across the longer period (or even across the sections, while acknowledging 
the limitation of the fixed effects estimation on the explanation of the change in this dimension). 
This differentiates our analysis from the cross-section estimation in the previous specification, 
which consider the relationship between the growth of income and the level of policy and institutional 
variables across countries. In contrast, this fixed effects estimation considers the relationship between 
the level of the income and the change of policy and institutional variables, with the emphasis on the 
time dimensions. The study of the level over time is essentially the study of the change or the growth. 
We use the following specification. 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼3 + 𝜃3𝑦𝑖0 + λ3𝑃𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿3𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (3) 
 The term 𝑦𝑖0, which represents initial level of income, will drop because it is included in fixed 
effect terms. 𝑃𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡 is country i’s average population growth rate in three-year span. 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡 is 
country i’s average policy variable in three-year span, while 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 is country i’s average institutional 
variable in three-year span. 𝜇𝑖 is country i’s fixed effect. We use the first lag of education and 
institutional variables to reflect that educational and institutional improvement takes time to affect 
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income growth. As in the cross-section estimation, we add the variable one by one to each estimation, 
and include all variables in single estimation. We give emphasis on the latter.  
 We interpret the coefficient of time-variant variables as the difference in the level of income 
with respect to the variable. For example, the coefficient of strong civil society indicator is the 
difference or the change of the estimated level of income, in any time span or between any sections, 
when the one-lag value of the indicator increases by 10 percentage points in the corresponding time 
span.
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5. Estimation Results 
 We first discuss the results, their statistical implication and possible bias of cross-section 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation. We thereafter continue to Fixed Effects panel estimation. 
The first cross-section estimation aims to identify the institutional indicators that relate to income 
level across the countries. However, it is not the focus of our discussion and we instead include it in 
Appendix 1. The second cross-section estimation considers the relationship of the level of both policy 
and institutional variables on the change of income level across the countries. The Fixed Effects panel 
estimation controls for time-invariant variables; and it considers the relationship of the level of both 
policy and institutional variables and the level of income across both time and countries, which can be 
partly interpreted as the study of the change of the level across time. In this estimation, lag education 
and policy variables are used instead of the current level. Time-invariant factors are controlled. 
 The estimation results report uses variable codes. See Appendix 3 for the variable list and 
respective coding for estimations. 
 5.1 Cross-section Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation results 
 In this study, our focus is on the effect of both policy and institutional variables. The 
specification (1) discuss only the relationship between the institutional indicators and income level, 
while incorporating interaction terms to see the complementarity and substitutability between the 
institutional indicators. As it is not our main discussion, we put the results in Appendix 1. 
 We now focus on the main discussion of this paper. We use the Cross-section estimation, 
where the dependent variable is the change of GDP per capita in 2005 constant US Dollar, between 
the beginning and the end of our period of interest; following specification (2) in the previous section. 
We add the policy variables into the analysis. All variables are the average across the whole period. 
The initial level of education variable is also used. Now, we have a dependent variable as the change, 
while we have independent variables as the level. Hence, we cannot say that an increase in the level of 
independent variables will lead to a higher or lower rate of change of dependent variables. We can 
only say that the higher level will lead to higher or lower rate of change. This also implies that the 
initial condition of countries is not controlled. We run estimation by adding each independent variable 
once; and run the estimation with all independent variables included. Some policy variables, such as 
the number of US patent applications per million populations and R&D expenditure to GDP, have 
high correlation coefficients (0.85 and significant at 1 percent). Hence, the use of separate estimation 
provides clearer picture on the relationship between the policy variables and dependent variable. The 
results for all countries, lower income, and higher income country groups are shown in the Table 5.1, 
5.2, and 5.3 respectively. 
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 For all countries estimation, R&D expenditure to GDP has positive, significant coefficients in 
the estimation with only one policy independent variable and the estimation with all variables. In the 
former, one percent higher R&D expenditure to GDP relates to 26 percent higher growth for the 
period of 1995-2012; while in the latter, it relates to 48 percent higher growth for the period. The 
number of US patent applications per million population has small, negative and significant 
coefficient in the estimation with all variables. This is probably because of its high correlation with 
R&D expenditure. Regarding institutional variables, the Accountable Executive has the significant, 
negative relationship with the growth in both estimations. The size is roughly about 0.06, which 
implies that the growth during the whole period is predicted to be lower by 6 percent when the 
average level of Accountable Executive is higher by 10 percentage points. The Strong Civil Society 
only has the significant, positive relationship with the growth in the estimation with all independent 
variables. The size is 0.04, which means that the higher level of Strong Civil Society indicators by 10 
percentage points can predict 4 percent higher growth rate for the whole period. The Law and Order 
indicator’s coefficient is positive and significant in the estimation with only an institutional variable, 
and insignificant in another estimation. 
 We shall not discuss the estimation results from the lower income country group in detail. 
Due to the smaller size of sample, we cannot determine the significance level for the estimation with 
all independent variables. Regarding the estimation with each independent variables. All significant 
coefficients have wrong sign and we cannot interpret the economic implications. 
 Considering the higher income countries group estimation, the trade openness variable (Trade 
to GDP ratio) is significant in the estimation with only one independent variable and also in the 
estimation with all independent variables. However, the sign of coefficients in both estimation are 
different. The size is small though, so it is not our focus. The number of US patent applications per 
million populations has positive, significant coefficient in both estimation with an independent 
variable and with all independent variables. The size of coefficients in the latter estimation is about 
0.01. The country with higher average number of patent applications per million population by one 
patent is predicted to have higher growth rate by 1 percent for the whole period of study. The R&D 
expenditure to GDP has significant coefficient only in the estimation with an independent variable. 
The insignificance coefficient in another regression is expected to be the result of high correlation 
with the number of patent applications. Regarding institutional variables, the Accountable Executive 
indicator has a negative, significant coefficient in the estimation with one independent variables; 
while the coefficient is still negative but insignificant in the estimation with all independent variables. 
The Strong Civil Society indicator has positive coefficients in both estimation, but only significant in 
the estimation with all independent variables. The Bureaucratic Quality has positive, significant 
coefficients in both estimations. However, the size is much larger in the estimation with all 
independent variables. It is 0.73, versus 0.08 in another estimation. This means that the country that 
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has the higher level of Bureaucratic Quality by 10 percentage points is predicted to have a higher 
growth rate for the whole period of study by 73 percent. The Law and Order indicator has positive and 
significant coefficients in the estimation with only one independent variable, while the coefficient is 
negative and significant in another estimation. This is probably the result of the interaction effect 
between the Bureaucratic Quality and the Law and order, discussed in the Appendix 1. We expect the 
interaction effect to make the size of the coefficient of Bureaucratic Quality in the estimation with all 
independent variables very high.
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Table 5.1: The cross-section estimation results using the change of GDP per capita as dependent variable for all countries 
 Dependent variable: the difference between the natural log of GDP per capita in 2012 and 1995 
lny0 -0.127 -0.067 -0.097 -0.128 -0.102 -0.149 -0.065 -0.035 -0.052 -0.079 -0.109 -0.165 
 (1.88)* (1.03) (1.01) (1.55) (1.64) (2.78)** (1.15) (0.70) (0.85) (1.33) (2.63)** (2.48)** 
avpopgr -0.207 -0.223 -0.192 -0.182 -0.134 -0.141 -0.161 -0.167 -0.144 -0.138 -0.106 -0.053 
 (1.90)* (2.09)** (1.84)* (1.97)* (1.63) (1.87)* (1.88)* (2.22)** (1.63) (1.64) (1.64) (0.75) 
secenr0 0.003            
 (0.69)            
avsecenr  -0.002          0.001 
  (0.43)          (0.21) 
terenr0   0.001          
   (0.20)          
avterenr    0.004        0.001 
    (0.82)        (0.14) 
avpatpm     0.001       -0.003 
     (1.57)       (2.18)* 
avrdex      0.258      0.475 
      (3.20)***      (2.80)** 
avtrade       0.001     -0.001 
       (0.91)     (1.38) 
avae        -0.063    -0.058 
        (3.05)***    (2.11)* 
avcs         0.008   0.043 
         (0.35)   (2.60)** 
avbq          0.037  0.003 
          (1.16)  (0.09) 
avlo           0.102 0.041 
           (4.40)*** (1.52) 
_cons 1.590 1.444 1.441 1.582 1.410 1.713 1.125 1.420 1.032 1.054 0.930 1.744 
 (2.96)*** (2.62)** (2.13)** (2.77)** (2.87)*** (4.05)*** (2.50)** (3.37)*** (2.17)** (2.47)** (2.87)*** (3.08)** 
R2 0.29 0.21 0.19 0.23 0.21 0.45 0.16 0.38 0.14 0.18 0.52 0.89 
N 23 26 23 26 28 25 28 27 27 28 28 22 
1. *,**,*** denote significance level at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. 
2. The t-value is in parenthesis 
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Table 5.2: The cross-section estimation results using the change of GDP per capita as dependent variable for lower income countries 
 Dependent variable: the difference between the natural log of GDP per capita in 2012 and 1995 
lny0 -0.392 -0.405 -0.371 -0.366 -0.360 -0.386 -0.425 -0.302 -0.377 -0.365 -0.257  
 (4.28)** (5.63)*** (3.68)** (3.75)*** (4.81)*** (4.34)*** (5.44)*** (3.11)** (2.45)** (3.70)** (1.82)  
avpopgr -0.152 -0.117 -0.069 -0.068 -0.130 -0.159 -0.133 -0.041 -0.072 -0.067 -0.053 -0.017 
 (1.93) (2.06)* (0.94) (0.90) (2.03)* (2.27)* (2.11)* (0.61) (0.90) (0.87) (0.75)  
secenr0 -0.001            
 (0.36)            
avsecenr  -0.006          0.005 
  (2.37)*           
terenr0   0.001          
   (0.16)          
avterenr    -0.000        -0.008 
    (0.04)         
avpatpm     -0.219        
     (2.05)*        
avrdex      -0.111       
      (0.20)       
avtrade       -0.002     -0.002 
       (2.15)*      
avae        -0.032    -0.037 
        (1.39)     
avcs         0.012   -0.128 
         (0.09)    
avbq          0.004  0.060 
          (0.12)   
avlo           0.051 0.082 
           (1.01)  
_cons 3.428 3.795 3.043 3.029 3.150 3.344 3.728 2.762 3.075 2.994 2.003 0.333 
 (4.54)** (6.45)*** (4.41)*** (4.42)*** (5.98)*** (5.03)*** (6.13)*** (4.42)*** (3.53)** (4.04)*** (1.68)  
R2 0.87 0.86 0.73 0.73 0.84 0.86 0.85 0.79 0.73 0.73 0.77 1.00 
N 8 10 10 10 10 9 10 10 10 10 10 9 
1. *,**,*** denote significance level at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. 
2. The t-value is in parenthesis 
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Table 5.3: The cross-section estimation results using the change of GDP per capita as dependent variable for higher income countries 
 Dependent variable: the difference between the natural log of GDP per capita in 2012 and 1995 
lny0 -0.262 -0.176 -0.303 -0.210 -0.306 -0.236 -0.280 -0.143 -0.163 -0.256 -0.254 -1.915 
 (2.09)* (1.63) (1.89)* (1.87)* (3.25)*** (3.09)*** (3.11)*** (1.79)* (1.61) (2.57)** (4.29)*** (12.31)* 
avpopgr -0.143 -0.293 -0.172 -0.231 -0.058 -0.048 -0.200 -0.198 -0.099 -0.107 -0.078 0.023 
 (0.92) (1.84)* (1.09) (1.79)* (0.60) (0.51) (1.97)* (1.88)* (0.79) (1.03) (1.04) (0.94) 
secenr0 0.004            
 (0.62)            
avsecenr  -0.006          0.001 
  (0.61)          (0.37) 
terenr0   0.003          
   (0.29)          
avterenr    -0.000        -0.005 
    (0.08)        (4.05) 
avpatpm     0.002       0.014 
     (2.60)**       (8.77)* 
avrdex      0.240      -0.784 
      (2.89)**      (6.09) 
avtrade       0.002     -0.003 
       (2.49)**     (7.75)* 
avae        -0.072    -0.019 
        (2.76)**    (1.32) 
avcs         0.002   0.172 
         (0.06)   (12.82)** 
avbq          0.078  0.726 
          (1.81)*  (10.53)* 
avlo           0.113 -0.119 
           (4.49)*** (7.78)* 
_cons 2.605 2.803 3.169 2.573 3.065 2.398 2.927 2.487 1.982 2.339 2.100 12.331 
 (3.32)*** (3.44)*** (2.77)** (3.14)*** (4.10)*** (3.96)*** (4.00)*** (3.75)*** (2.47)** (3.39)*** (4.68)*** (13.22)** 
R2 0.41 0.45 0.44 0.43 0.49 0.54 0.47 0.53 0.25 0.38 0.69 1.00 
N 15 16 13 16 18 16 18 17 17 18 18 13 
1. *,**,*** denote significance level at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. 
2. The t-value is in parenthesis 
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 5.2 Fixed Effects panel estimation results 
 Now we consider our last specification. We use the Fixed Effects panel model to eliminate 
time-invariant endogeneity. The analysis focuses on the level of dependent variable – specifically, the 
level of GDP per capita during three-year sub period – as the relationship with the level of the time-
variant policy and institutional independent variables. The contribution from the level of all time-
invariant independent variables to the dependent variable, specifically the income level, is included in 
the fixed-effects term. Hence, the coefficients can be interpreted as the contribution to the income 
level from the level of independent variables in our interest. We give more emphasis on the time 
dimension, while acknowledging the change across the section, due to the Fixed Effect estimator’s 
demeaning across time technique. The change of the level of the policy and institutional variables 
over time translates to the change of the level of income over time; which means the growth. We use 
one lag variables for education and institutional variables to acknowledge that the effect takes time to 
materialise. As in the previous specification, we run estimation by adding each independent variable 
once; and run the estimation with all independent variables included. The estimation follows the 
specification (3) from the previous section. The results for all countries, lower income, and higher 
income country groups are shown in Table 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6 respectively. 
 We first look at the estimation results for all countries sample. Regarding policy variables, all 
of them – the Trade to GDP ratio, the one lag of secondary education enrolment rate, the one lag of 
tertiary education enrolment rate, the patent applications per million populations, and the R&D 
expenditure to GDP – have positive coefficients, significant at 1-percent level when we add only one 
policy independent variable in each estimations. However, the value for the patent applications’ 
coefficient is small. We can conclude that the difference of each policy variables’ level, without 
adding other variables for controlling purpose, have a positive relationship with the difference of the 
income level. Focusing on the time dimensions, the positive change of the level of policy variables 
over time relates to the growth. In the estimation with all variables included, the secondary education 
enrolment rate does not have the effect on the income; while the tertiary education enrolment rate has 
positive relationship. The one percentage point increase in the tertiary education enrolment rate in 
lagged three-year sub period can predict higher GDP per capita by 1.1 percent. The R&D expenditure 
to GDP also has the significant, positive coefficients. The one percent increase in the R&D 
expenditure to GDP can predict the higher GDP per capita by 55 percent. The coefficient of the patent 
applications is significant and slightly negative. This is probably the result of its high correlation with 
the R&D expenditure. Regarding institutional variables, one lag of the Accountable Executive 
indicator and one lag of the Law and Order indicator are significant in the estimations with only each 
institutional independent variable; though the latter has negative sign. None of institutional variables 
is significant in the estimation with all independent variables. Controlling for policy variables, we 
cannot draw the relationship between institutional indicators and income level. 
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 We move on to the estimation for the lower income country group. In this countries sample, 
we cannot estimate the relationship when all variables is included in single estimation because of the 
small sample size. When we estimate each policy or institutional variable once at a time, the 
coefficients of one lag of secondary education enrolment, one lag of Accountable Executive, and one 
lag of the Bureaucratic Quality are significant and positive. What we can draw from this is that the 
countries in the lower income group that have experienced an increase in these variables during the 
previous three-year sub period should have a higher level of income. However, we cannot determine 
whether all of the policy and institutional variables are the determinants of higher income because we 
do not know whether there are omitted variables that affect our independent and dependent variables 
at the same time. One lag of Law and Order indicator has a negative, significant coefficient in the 
estimation with only the population growth as a control variable and one lag of Law and Order 
indicator as an independent variable. 
 Lastly, we consider the estimation results from the higher income country group. All policy 
variables have positive and significant coefficients in the estimation with only one independent 
variable. In the estimation with all independent variables, one lag of tertiary education enrolment and 
the R&D expenditure to GDP still have positive, significant coefficients. One percent increase in the 
tertiary education enrolment rate from the previous three-year sub period can predict 1.2-percent 
increase in the level of GDP per capita for the current three-year sub period. At the same time, one 
percent increase in the R&D expenditure to GDP in three-year sub period can predict 60 percent 
increase in the level of GDP per capita. The coefficient for the patent applications is slightly negative 
and significant. We expect this to be the effect from its high correlation with the R&D expenditure. 
Regarding institutional variables, one lag of Law and Order has the negative and significant 
relationship in the estimation with only one institutional independent variable, while become 
insignificant in the estimation with all independent variables. One lag of Strong Civil Society 
indicator has negative and significant coefficient in the estimation with all independent variables, 
while the coefficient is insignificant in another estimation. The increased level of Strong Civil Society 
indicator by 10 percentage points in the previous three-year sub period can predict 1.7-percent 
decrease in the level of GDP per capita during the current sub period. 
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Table 5.4: The fixed effects panel estimation results for all countries 
 Dependent variable: average level of natural log of GDP per capita for the three-year sub period 
popgr -0.211 -0.179 -0.318 -0.293 -0.191 -0.097 -0.154 -0.159 -0.154 -0.117 -0.142 
 (1.95)* (1.81)* (3.57)*** (2.67)** (1.72)* (1.15) (1.05) (1.07) (1.08) (1.02) (1.09) 
trade  0.003         0.002 
  (2.78)***         (0.79) 
L.secenr   0.007        -0.000 
   (3.05)***        (0.07) 
L.terenr    0.010       0.011 
    (3.84)***       (5.10)*** 
patpm     0.001      -0.002 
     (4.09)***      (2.97)*** 
rdex      0.526     0.546 
      (3.19)***     (2.37)** 
L.ae       0.026    0.009 
       (2.39)**    (0.93) 
L.cs        0.008   -0.009 
        (0.35)   (1.38) 
L.bq         0.001  -0.004 
         (0.12)  (0.22) 
L.lo          -0.046 0.006 
          (3.56)*** (0.42) 
_cons 8.356 8.046 8.032 8.102 8.382 8.156 8.027 8.192 8.277 8.483 7.610 
 (53.72)*** (39.28)*** (37.02)*** (43.27)*** (50.22)*** (48.89)*** (33.86)*** (35.96)*** (40.47)*** (76.68)*** (19.44)*** 
R2 0.18 0.28 0.43 0.54 0.26 0.52 0.14 0.09 0.08 0.19 0.76 
N 173 171 117 109 161 112 140 140 145 145 65 
1. *,**,*** denote significance level at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. 
2. The t-value is in parenthesis 
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Table 5.5: The fixed effects panel estimation results for lower income countries 
 Dependent variable: average level of natural log of GDP per capita for the three-year sub period 
popgr -0.397 -0.326 -0.283 -0.341 -0.419 -0.368 -0.395 -0.439 -0.414 -0.373 
 (3.21)*** (2.55)** (2.58)** (2.47)** (3.17)*** (2.50)** (2.45)** (2.70)** (2.44)** (2.45)** 
trade  0.003         
  (1.15)         
L.secenr   0.007        
   (2.51)**        
L.terenr    0.011       
    (1.47)       
patpm     0.174      
     (1.56)      
rdex      0.202     
      (0.32)     
L.ae       0.039    
       (3.95)***    
L.cs        -0.022   
        (0.65)   
L.bq         0.025  
         (2.35)**  
L.lo          -0.030 
          (2.37)** 
_cons 7.719 7.362 7.256 7.494 7.768 7.860 7.426 7.829 7.630 7.812 
 (40.10)*** (19.90)*** (30.16)*** (26.14)*** (35.19)*** (39.45)*** (29.74)*** (31.48)*** (27.03)*** (30.05)*** 
R2 0.36 0.47 0.56 0.50 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.29 0.31 0.36 
N 65 63 40 44 53 26 55 55 55 55 
1. *,**,*** denote significance level at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. 
2. The t-value is in parenthesis 
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Table 5.6: The fixed effects panel estimation results for higher income countries 
 Dependent variable: average level of natural log of GDP per capita for the three-year sub period 
popgr -0.186 -0.161 -0.325 -0.269 -0.160 -0.080 -0.129 -0.131 -0.121 -0.090 -0.192 
 (1.66) (1.56) (2.69)** (1.99)* (1.45) (1.01) (0.88) (0.89) (0.88) (0.84) (1.15) 
trade  0.003         0.004 
  (2.72)**         (1.59) 
L.secenr   0.007        -0.003 
   (1.88)*        (0.90) 
L.terenr    0.010       0.012 
    (3.53)***       (4.22)*** 
patpm     0.001      -0.003 
     (4.08)***      (4.04)*** 
rdex      0.538     0.601 
      (3.15)***     (2.90)** 
L.ae       0.019    -0.003 
       (1.24)    (0.34) 
L.cs        0.012   -0.017 
        (0.50)   (2.23)** 
L.bq         -0.017  0.005 
         (1.18)  (0.31) 
L.lo          -0.053 0.019 
          (3.24)*** (0.78) 
_cons 8.879 8.570 8.422 8.520 8.803 8.368 8.607 8.696 8.918 9.088 7.843 
 (58.34)*** (41.89)*** (22.78)*** (38.66)*** (55.50)*** (46.64)*** (35.84)*** (38.86)*** (47.05)*** (109.55)*** (20.64)*** 
R2 0.16 0.24 0.41 0.56 0.25 0.54 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.17 0.80 
N 108 108 77 65 108 86 85 85 90 90 50 
1. *,**,*** denote significance level at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. 
2. The t-value is in parenthesis 
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6. Result Discussion and Policy Implications 
 In this section, we discuss the economic implications of the estimation results for policy-
making. We shall also mention the limitations of the results caused by the methodology. We first 
discuss the policy determinants and then move to the institutional determinants of growth. 
6.1 The policy determinants of growth 
 Our study focuses on the educational and technological policy determinants of growth 
following Lee & Kim (2008). Our results agree with them. In the Cross-section estimation for the 
higher-income countries group, the patent applications per million population and the R&D 
expenditure have the positive and significant relationship with the growth rate; while none of them 
has a significant relationship in the estimation for the lower income countries group. This implies the 
clear relationship between the technological development and growth, when we study the effect 
across the higher-income countries. Among the countries that already have passed the upper-middle 
income threshold, the country with a higher level of policy variables regarding technological 
development will experience higher growth rate.  
The result is even more solid in the Fixed Effects panel estimation, where both educational 
and technological policy determinants have a positive and significant relationship with the income 
level. In the higher-income countries estimation, the tertiary school enrolment rate, in addition to 
technological policy determinants, is another important determinant. In contrast, only the secondary 
school enrolment has a positive and significant relationship with the income level in the estimation for 
the lower-income countries group. 
We can conclude that the tertiary education and technological policy determinants become 
more crucial once the countries have passed the upper-middle income threshold. The country with the 
higher level of these determinants will have the higher level of income when comparing to other 
countries. At the same time, when we focus on the effect across time, the country that manages to 
increase the level of tertiary school enrolment and technological policy determinants will have the 
higher level of income, or have the growth. This is what the middle-income countries have to focus on 
in order to achieve the higher level of income and eventually catch up with the high-income countries. 
6.2 The institutional determinants of growth 
The main purpose of this study is to identify the institutional characteristics that affect the 
growth of the middle-income countries, by incorporating the institutional indicators identified by 
Campos & Nugent (1999) into Lee & Kim’s (2008) model.  
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Using the Cross-section estimation, the Strong Civil Society and the Bureaucratic Quality 
indicators have the positive and significant relationship with the growth rate in the higher-income 
countries group. None of the institutional indicators has significant relationship with the growth rate 
for lower income countries, which is probably due to the small sample size. 
Using the Fixed Effects panel model, only the Strong Civil Society has the negative and 
significant relationship with the level of income in the higher-income countries estimation, with all 
policy and institutional independent variables included. Even though we cannot estimate the model 
with all independent variables for the lower income countries, the models using each independent 
variable at a time suggest that the Accountable Executive and the Bureaucratic Quality have positive 
and significant relationship with the income level. 
The result for lower income countries may reflect that the institution is more important for 
economic growth when the income level is low; once the income level is higher, the good policy is 
crucial. Poorer countries only need the good authority to protect the property rights and enforce the 
contracts. This agrees with Barro (1998), which argued that the improvement in democracy will 
promote the growth for poorer countries, while negatively affects the growth when the countries have 
been developed to some degree. 
The difference between the results from the Cross-section and the Fixed Effects estimations 
can be explained by the difference between their methodologies. For the Cross-section estimation, the 
growth rate is estimated across countries, with the average level of the institutional indicators for the 
whole period as the independent variables. The country with the higher average level across the 
period of study of institutional variables, says the Strong Civil Society and the Bureaucratic Quality, is 
more likely to experience the higher growth rate than the country with the lower level of the variables. 
However, the Fixed Effects model explains the change across the time dimension better, due to the 
technique of demeaning within the section (across time); though we still have to acknowledge the 
assumption that the panel data’s parameter should explain the change across the section as well as the 
change across time. 
This led us to two statements. First, the countries that already have the higher level of 
institutional variables such as the Strong Civil Society will have a higher growth rate, while the 
country that have just experienced the improvement in the Civil Society possibly has to face with the 
lower income (over time), or the negative contribution to the growth rate from the improved Civil 
Society. The possible explanation is that the Strong Civil Society allows broader participation in the 
politics that helps better policy to materialise, in contrast to the dictatorship who often uses the power 
for personal interest. However, the improvement in the Civil Society is often not smooth. It involves 
policy changes and uncertainty among the investors that dampen the growth. Second, our estimation 
possibly does not use enough lags, as the institutional determinants may affect the growth in longer 
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run. For the lower income countries, however, the sudden improvement in the institutional 
characteristics will improve the income dramatically as the binding constraints such as the secure 
property rights became guaranteed. 
6.3 The policy implications for the middle-income countries 
From the estimation results, we can see that the tertiary education and technological policies 
have significant effects on the growth of income level, either the effect across the countries or the 
effect across time. What country should do is to promote the higher education; and implement the 
policies that make the environment favourable to Research and Development 
However, this study has a limitation. Using the Tertiary School enrolment rate does not 
incorporate the quality of higher education; while the patent applications and the R&D expenditure 
seems to be the straightforward measures for technological development. While our study confirms 
the positive relationship between the Tertiary School enrolment rate and the growth, our 
recommendation is not just to increase access to the education without quality. When we conduct the 
estimation, we assume other factors other than what we are interested constant. However, the reality is 
obviously different from what we assume. Therefore, our suggestion is to improve access to the 
Tertiary education; at the same time, we also have to ensure that the quality of education is aligned 
with the international standard. Regarding technological policy, it is important for the state to provide 
additional support because of its positive externality nature. The positive and significant coefficients 
of these variables in both the cross-section and the Fixed Effects panel estimations imply that the 
country with the higher level of tertiary education enrolment and technological indicators can achieve 
the higher growth rate, whether we look at the effect across the countries or across time. 
The effect of institutional factors on economic growth is more complicated to consider. While 
we identify the institutional characteristics that positively related to the growth across the countries, 
the result from the Fixed Effects panel estimation does not provide the support for the positive impact 
of the institutional indicators on the income level and growth. Giving policy recommendation is even 
harder, because the policymakers cannot create good institutions by themselves. Instead, the 
institutional change often involves the conflicts between the interest groups and is not very smooth. 
The ongoing political conflict in Thailand is one of the examples of the institutional change. 
Hence, once the country has progress to the upper-middle income country, we do not 
recommend the policymakers to focus on the institutional issue. Instead, the policy focusing on 
education and technology is the important issue. There are also several examples where the country 
became more democratic – reflected primarily on the Accountable Executive and the Strong Civil 
Society, after they had grown until one point. These includes Taiwan, China and the Republic of 
Korea. Once they nearly progress to high-income countries, they become the democratic countries and 
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also experience the slower growth at the same time. This is because they were closer to the frontier; 
and this might explains why the Civil Society have negative relationship with the income level. 
The policy is often the result of the institutions that promoting it. While the common belief is 
that the high level of the institutional indicators we studied will lead to good policy, there are the 
cases that the strong, authoritarian government can also make the good policy that affects the growth 
positively. These includes the Republic of Korea before late 1980’s, Singapore, and Chile during 
Pinochet’s era. The widely held prescription is probably not the only prescription. 
However, our suggestion is that once the course of the history for the country necessitates the 
institutional change, for example, when people feel that their country needs the reform of the political 
institution; what policymakers should do is to encourage the improvement in the Accountable 
Executive and the Bureaucratic Quality characteristics of the institutions. Possible actions are to 
promote the political system that strengthens the power of legislature to check the executive branch; 
and to promote the bureaucratic system that recruits people by merit, and that sets up the rule to 
protect the bureaucracy from political intervention. This will help the countries to have the higher 
growth rate relative to other countries. With the higher growth rate, they are more probable to escape 
the middle-income trap. Malaysia is one of the examples of the countries that are struggling with the 
lower growth because of their low level of institutional characteristics. (Woo, 2009)
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7. Conclusion 
 Many middle-income countries, especially the upper-middle income ones that are closer to 
the development frontier, are aspiring to catch up with the high-income countries. At the same time, 
they are worried that they will ‘miss the train’ and fall into the long period of stagnation known as the 
middle-income trap. This study aims to identify the institutional characteristics that promote the 
growth for the middle-income countries, especially the ones that have already passed the upper-
middle income threshold; using the Cross-section OLS estimation and the Fixed Effects panel 
estimation. At the same time, we incorporate educational and technological variables, widely 
discussed as the determinants of growth for the middle-income countries to retest their validity. 
 The results confirm the relationship between the growth and the policy variables; including 
the tertiary education enrolment, and the technological policy using the number of the US patent 
applications per million populations and the R&D expenditure to GDP as proxy variables. This is the 
clear prescription for the policymakers. Regarding the institutional variables, the country with the 
higher level of Strong Civil Society and Bureaucratic Quality is more likely to experience the higher 
growth rate when we consider the effect across countries. However, we cannot determine the positive 
effect of the institutional variables on the growth when we consider the effect primarily across time. 
In some case, improving the institutional characteristics even brings the negative effect on the growth 
across the shorter period of time. Nevertheless, when the course of history necessitates the 
institutional reform, the two institutional characteristics abovementioned should be the priority for the 
policymakers.
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Appendix 1. The cross-section estimation results  
using average level of GDP per capita as dependent variable  
and only the institutional indicators as independent variables 
This appendix is the discussion of the results from the specification (1), which is the 
relationship between the institutional indicators and the income level, with the interaction terms to see 
the complementarity and substitutability between the institutional indicators 
First, we consider the estimation using the average level of GDP per capita as dependent 
variable, with only institutional indicators as independent variables. It follows the specification (1) 
discussed in Section 4.2. There are two sub-specifications, specifically with and without institutional 
interaction terms. We discuss the latter first, with the results shown in Table A1.1. For all countries 
sample, the Bureaucratic Quality and the Law and Order indicators are significant and positive. The 
country that has a higher level of the Bureaucratic Quality indicator by 10 percentage points is 
predicted to has a higher level of the average GDP per capita in constant 2005 US Dollar by 1,225. 
The same goes for the Law and Order, where the country that has a higher level of the indicator by 10 
percentage points is predicted to have a higher level of the GDP per capita by 1,079 US Dollar. For 
higher income countries sample, only the Bureaucratic Quality is significant. The additional 10 
percentage points of indicator predict a higher level of the average GDP per capita by 1,982 US 
Dollar. No variable is significant for the lower income countries group, which is possibly because of 
the small sample size. 
 Next, we consider the estimation using sub-specification with the institutional interaction 
terms. Using the interaction terms, we consider the complementarity and substitutability between the 
institutional indicators. The results show in Table A1.2. Consider all countries sample, the Law and 
Order has a negative and significant coefficient, while the interaction term between the Law and 
Order and the Bureaucratic Quality has a positive and significant coefficient. The 10 percentage 
points increase in the Law and Order indicator predict lower GDP per capita by 4,774 US Dollar. At 
the same time, the 10 percentage points increase in the interaction term between the Law and Order 
and the Bureaucratic Quality predict higher GDP per capita by 9,932 US Dollar. The absolute size of 
the interaction term’s coefficient is larger than the absolute size of both components’ coefficients 
combined, even though Bureaucratic Quality’s coefficient is insignificant. What we can conclude is 
that the Law and Order and the Bureaucratic Quality jointly predict the increase in GDP per capita in 
all countries sample. The worth noting point is that a point increase (out of the total of ten) in each 
components of the interaction term does not translate to a point increase in the level of interaction 
term. For example; when the country has quite low level of interaction components, says 2 points, the 
increment of both indicators by a point will increase the interaction term from 0.4 to 0.9, which is 0.5 
point (or 5 percentage points) increment. (We calculate the interaction terms by multiplying the 
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component with each another, and divide the result by 10 to rescale it from 0-100 to 0-10) However, 
when the country has a higher level of interaction components, says 5 which is roughly the mean of 
the Law and Order and the Bureaucratic Quality, the increment of both indicators by a point will 
increase the interaction term from 2.5 to 3.6, which is 1.1 points (or 11 percentage points) increment. 
While none of the coefficients in the lower income countries group is significant, several 
coefficients are significant in the higher income countries group. The ten percentage points increase in 
the Bureaucratic Quality predict lower GDP per capita by 7,046 US Dollar; while the ten percentage 
points increase in the Law and Order predict lower GDP per capita by 6,595 US Dollar. However, the 
ten percentage points increase in the interaction terms between these two indicators predicts higher 
GDP per capita by 15,570 US Dollars. The size of interaction term’s coefficient is larger than the size 
of the sum of both indicators’ coefficients. This means that Bureaucratic Quality and Law and Order 
jointly predicts the higher GDP per capita. The coefficient of the interaction term between the 
Bureaucratic Quality and the Strong Civil Society is significant and negative. It predicts the lower 
GDP per capita by 9,229 US Dollar. Taking the size of insignificant Strong Civil Society’s coefficient 
into account, the total effect is still negative. This means that the Bureaucratic Quality and the Strong 
Civil Society jointly predicts lower GDP per capita. Both indicators are substitute, and the increase in 
the Strong Civil Society when the Bureaucratic Quality indicator is in high level will predict the lower 
GDP per capita. 
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Table A1.1: The cross-section estimation results using average level of GDP per capita as dependent 
variable, without interaction terms 
Dependent variable: average level of GDP per capita across the whole period 
 1 2 3 
Accountable Executive (ae) -336.193 46.682 -426.320 
 (0.69) (0.42) (0.54) 
Strong Civil Society (cs) 254.147 391.175 102.658 
 (0.61) (0.72) (0.19) 
Bureaucratic Quality (bq) 1,225.042 63.997 1,982.127 
 (2.56)** (0.65) (2.30)** 
Law and Order (lo) 1,079.011 -72.916 697.956 
 (1.76)* (0.36) (0.69) 
_cons -5,676.334 17.053 -5,796.480 
 (1.15) (0.01) (0.70) 
R2 0.49 0.35 0.57 
N 28 11 17 
1. *,**,*** denote significance level at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. 
 2. The model 1, 2, and 3 represent all, lower, and higher income countries respectively 
3. The t-value is in parenthesis 
Table A1.2: The cross-section estimation results using average level of GDP per capita as dependent 
variable, with interaction terms 
Dependent variable: average level of GDP per capita across the whole period 
 1 2 3 
ae 478.921 7,059.455 -733.899 
 (0.32)  (0.37) 
cs 2,488.009 7,755.878 4,171.623 
 (1.00)  (1.55) 
bq -1,422.251 2,092.132 -7,046.681 
 (0.90)  (2.19)* 
lo -4,773.913 6,208.396 -6,594.741 
 (1.97)*  (2.11)* 
Interactions 
terms 
   
bq_lo 9,932.163 -4,977.218 15,570.179 
 (5.79)***  (4.99)*** 
bq_cs -3,372.614 -3,525.394 -9,229.102 
 (1.01)  (2.30)* 
bq_ae -1,613.810 685.847 4,829.575 
 (0.86)  (1.41) 
lo_cs -2,970.400 12,349.331 204.236 
 (1.17)  (0.07) 
lo_ae 1,413.250 -9,400.273 -2,748.404 
 (0.52)  (0.76) 
cs_ae 744.314 -13,111.570 503.915 
 (0.27)  (0.17) 
_cons 7,554.314 -50,444.002 30,668.219 
 (0.60)  (1.62) 
R2 0.88 1.00 0.95 
N 28 11 17 
1. *,**,*** denote significance level at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. 
 2. The model 1, 2, and 3 represent all, lower, and higher income countries respectively 
3. The t-value is in parenthesis 
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Appendix 2. List of abbreviations 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GNI Gross National Income 
ICRG International Country Risk Guide 
OLS Ordinary Least Squares estimation 
PPP Purchasing Power Parity 
R&D Research and Development 
TFP Total Factor Productivity 
USPTO United States Patent and Trademark Office 
WDI World Development Indicators 
WGI Worldwide Governance Indicators 
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Appendix 3. The variable list and respective coding for estimations 
Specification (1) Cross-section estimation with the average level of GDP per capita in constant 
2005 US Dollar as dependent variable 
Variable codes Description 
ae Accountable Executive indicator 
cs Strong Civil Society indicator 
bq Bureaucratic Quality indicator 
lo Law and Order indicator 
bq_lo Interaction term between Bureaucratic Quality and Law and Order indicators 
bq_cs Interaction term between Bureaucratic Quality and Strong Civil Society 
indicators 
bq_ae Interaction term between Bureaucratic Quality and Accountable Executive 
indicators 
lo_cs Interaction term between Law and Order and Strong Civil Society indicators 
lo_ae Interaction term between Law and Order and Accountable Executive indicators 
cs_ae Interaction term between Strong Civil Society and Accountable Executive 
indicators 
Specification (2) Cross-section estimation with the difference, between the level in 2012 and 1995, 
of the natural log of GDP per capita in constant 2005 US Dollar as dependent variable 
Variable codes Description 
lny0 Natural log of GDP per capita in constant 2005 US Dollar, in 1995 
avpopgr Population growth rate, average value from 1995-2012 
secenr0 Secondary education enrolment rate, gross percentage, in 1995 
avsecenr Secondary education enrolment rate, gross percentage, average value from 
1995-2012 
terenr0 Tertiary education enrolment rate, gross percentage, in 1995 
avterenr Tertiary education enrolment rate, gross percentage, average value from 1995-
2012 
avpatpm Number of US patent applications per million populations, average value from 
1995-2012 
avrdex Research and Development expenditure as percentage of GDP, average value 
from 1995-2012 
avtrade Trade as percentage of GDP, average value from 1995-2012 
avae Accountable Executive indicator, average value from 1995-2012 
avcs Strong Civil Society indicator, average value from 1995-2012 
avbq Bureaucratic Quality indicator, average value from 1995-2012 
avlo Law and Order indicator, average value from 1995-2012 
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Specification (3) Fixed Effects panel estimation with the average level, for the three-year sub 
period, of the natural log of GDP per capita in constant 2005 US Dollar as dependent variable 
Variable codes Description 
popgr Population growth rate, average value for three-year sub period 
trade Trade as percentage of GDP, average value for three-year sub period 
L.secenr One sub period lag of Secondary education enrolment rate, gross percentage, 
average value for three-year sub period 
L.terenr One sub period lag of Tertiary education enrolment rate, gross percentage, 
average value for three-year sub period 
patpm Number of US patent applications per million populations, average value for 
three-year sub period 
rdex Research and Development expenditure as percentage of GDP, average value 
for three-year sub period 
L.ae One sub period lag of Accountable Executive indicator, average value for three-
year sub period 
L.cs One sub period lag of Strong Civil Society indicator, average value for three-
year sub period 
L.bq One sub period lag of Bureaucratic Quality indicator, average value for three-
year sub period 
L.lo One sub period lag of Law and Order indicator, average value for three-year sub 
period 
 
 
 
